The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) was enacted by the 107th Congress, 2nd Session, and signed into law by President Bush on March 27, 2002 to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (now located at Title 52, Subtitle III of the U.S.
Does the Anti-Injunction Act bar pre-enforcement challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act to newly promulgated agency guidelines that include discretionary tax-penalty enforcement provisions, or is the act narrowly confined to direct tax assessments and collections?
This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the Anti-Injunction Act and to determine whether it bars pre-enforcement legal challenges to agency guidelines and regulations that incorporate a tax-penalty enforcement mechanism into the framework. CIC Services argues that the Supreme Court should construe the Administrative Procedure Act’s review provisions broadly enough and the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibitory provisions narrowly enough to provide material tax advisors relief from the Internal Revenue Service’s new interpretative guidelines concerning reportable transactions. The Internal Revenue Service counters that the Anti-Injunction Act applies to CIC’s challenge so the lawsuit is barred and that none of the available exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act’s provisions apply to CIC’s sought injunction. This case has important implications for corporations whose business involves reporting earnings to the Internal Revenue Service, as well as for federal agencies’ abilities to avoid lawsuits by tying in certain tax-penalty provisions.
Whether the Anti-Injunction Act’s bar on lawsuits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes also bars challenges to unlawful regulatory mandates issued by administrative agencies that are not taxes.
The Internal Revenue Service has the authority to require taxpayers and some third parties to submit certain records about “reportable transactions.” CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Serv. at 249. The Internal Revenue Service also defines what constitutes a reportable transaction.
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) is the codification of the federal government's rules and regulations published in the Federal Register. The official version is published annually by the Office of the Federal Register and the Government Publishing Office.
If a regulation doesn’t affect a party directly but only predictably, can that party still satisfy the redressability requirement for standing and bring a lawsuit?
This case asks the Court to determine whether fuel producers, like Diamond Alternative Energy, have standing to sue the EPA for its decision to allow California to impose stricter emissions standards than those in the federal Clean Air Act. Diamond argues that, while the decision affects only car manufacturers directly, and fuel producers only indirectly, the decision’s negative consequences for conventional fuel producers are so predictable that they should be able to sue to block the decision. Petitioners further argue that not allowing those who are indirectly regulated to sue would leave them dependent on third parties who may not share their interests and give the government an incentive to impose burdensome regulations. The Environmental Protection Agency, on the other hand, contends that allowing this type of standing would undermine the purpose of the Court’s standing requirements, which is to ensure that the Court resolves real, not hypothetical disputes and that a favorable court decision for a plaintiff remedies the harm they allege. This case touches on important questions about how regulations affect a variety of parties and who can bring suit when they believe the government has harmed them.
Whether a party may establish the redressability component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties.
The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) gives the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) the authority to promulgate federal emissions standards for new automobiles which preempt any conflicting state regulations because of
Are weapons parts kits or incomplete frames or receivers regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968?
This case asks the Court to determine whether the Gun Control Act of 1968’s definition of “firearm” permits the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) to regulate weapons parts kits and incomplete frames and receivers. Merrick Garland, Attorney General, et al., argues that a natural reading of the word “firearm” includes weapon parts kits, incomplete frames, and receivers; and, that failing to regulate these items would create a loophole in the nation’s gun laws. Jennifer VanDerStok et al., counters that the rule is outside the scope of the ATF’s authority. This case touches on important questions regarding the Gun Control Act of 1968, and its ability to regulate ghost guns.
(1) Whether “a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive” under 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 is a “firearm” regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968; and (2) whether “a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver” that is “designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver” under 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c) is a “frame or receiver” regulated by the act.
The definition of “firearm” in the Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) includes “any weapon… which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,” as well as “the frame or receiver of any such weapon.” VanDerStok v.
Does Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over state law claims based on violations of the Exchange Act, or may state courts hear those state law claims?
In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) provides federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over state law claims based on violations of the Exchange Act or whether state courts are permitted to hear such state law claims. See Brief for Petitioner, Merrill Lynch, et al. at i. Merrill Lynch argues that Manning relies on Regulation SHO, a federal regulation, and therefore federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction under the Exchange Act. See id. at 19. On the other hand, Manning argues that, because his claims are based on state law, state courts have jurisdiction over this case, even if some elements of his claim rely on federal law. See Brief for Respondent, Greg Manning, et al. at 25. Ultimately, the Court’s decision has the potential to affect whether uniformity in decision-making is necessary to enforce Regulation SHO and whether state courts can govern duties arising under federal regulations. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, in Support of Petitioner at 8–9.
Does Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provide federal jurisdiction over state law claims seeking to establish liability based on violations of the Act or its regulations or seeking to enforce duties created by the Act or its regulations?
Greg Manning and others (hereinafter “Manning”), brought a lawsuit against Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., Knight Capital Americas L.P., UBS Securities LLC,
Is the EPA required to consider costs when determining whether it is appropriate and necessary to regulate hazardous air pollutants emitted by electric utilities?
The United States Supreme Court will consider whether the EPA acted reasonably based on the agency’s interpretation of its obligations under the Clean Air Act when it did not consider the costs, during rulemaking, of regulating the emissions of hazardous air pollutants from oil- and coal-fired electric utilities. The Petitioners argue that because the EPA did not consider cost of compliance as a factor in its decision, the EPA’s rule is an incorrect interpretation of the Clean Air Act and is unreasonable. The Respondents counter that the EPA acted reasonably and correctly interpreted the Clean Air Act by not considering cost of compliance as a factor in its decision to regulate hazardous air pollutants from electric utility plants. The Court’s decision will implicate the regulation of hazardous air pollutant emissions from electric utilities, and may have broader implications for the statutory interpretation of similar regulatory mandates to agencies.
The Clean Air Act treats electric utilities differently from other sources of hazardous air pollutants. Other sources are required to limit their emissions if they exceed quantitative thresholds. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1) & (d)(1). By contrast, before EPA regulates hazardous air pollutants from electric utilities, it must first conduct a study of the hazards to public health resulting from those emissions even after imposition of all the other requirements of the Clean Air Act, and then decide whether it is "appropriate and necessary" to regulate such residual emissions under § 7412 after considering the results of the study. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
The question for the Court is:
Whether EPA's interpretation of "appropriate" in 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) is unreasonable because it refused to consider a key factor (costs) when determining whether it is appropriate to regulate hazardous air pollutants emitted by electric utilities.
THE SUPREME COURT GRANTED CERT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING: Whether the Environmental Protection Agency unreasonably refused to consider costs in determining whether it is appropriate to regulate hazardous air pollutants emitted by electric utilities.
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in 1970, including what is now § 7412, to address issue of air pollution, focusing on reducing hazardous air pollutants (“HAPs”). See White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v.
Does a plaintiff bringing a claim for retaliation under §1514A of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 bear the burden of establishing the employer acted with retaliatory intent, or must the defendant employer demonstrate a lack of retaliatory intent as part of its defense?
This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whistleblowers’ evidentiary burden when they allege retaliation for conduct protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Petitioner Trevor Murray argues that he does not need to prove retaliatory intent to establish a claim against his employer because the language of §1514A and the statutory and administrative precedent establish that the protected activity only needs to be a contributing factor in the adverse personnel action. Respondent UBS argues that employees should be required to prove that their employers acted with retaliatory intent in their initial complaints because the texts of the statute and statutory precedent reflect Congress’s intention to create an intent element. The outcome of this case will determine the amount of proof required for whistleblowers to prove retaliation for protected activities.
Whether, following the burden-shifting framework that governs cases under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a whistleblower must prove his employer acted with a “retaliatory intent” as part of his case in chief, or whether the lack of “retaliatory intent” is part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof.
In 2011, Respondent UBS Securities, LLC hired Petitioner Trevor Murray as a strategist, a role that required him to certify that his reports “accurately reflected his own views” and that his compensation was not tied to his views. Murray v.
Did the Fifth Circuit correctly interpret the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama-Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act to subject the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo to all Texas gaming regulations?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Texas can regulate bingo and other gaming activities on tribal lands. Petitioner Ysleta del Sur Pueblo argues that the Court's precedent of Cabazon Band should control for purposes of statutory interpretation. Under Cabazon Band, tribes cannot operate games that state law prohibits; however, tribes do not have to follow state regulations governing games that are not otherwise prohibited. Respondent Texas maintains that the Restoration Act controls this issue, and that the Act does not incorporate the Cabazon Band interpretation. Therefore, Texas asserts that all gaming activities on tribal lands are subject to Texas regulations. The outcome of this case is limited to two tribes in Texas but could have implications on their tribal sovereignty.
Whether the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama-Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act provides the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo with sovereign authority to regulate non-prohibited gaming activities on their lands (including bingo), as set forth in the plain language of Section 107(b), the act’s legislative history and the Supreme Court’s holding in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, or whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision affirming Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas (Ysleta I) correctly subjects the Pueblo to all Texas gaming regulations.
The Ysleta del Sur Pueblo (“the Pueblo” or “the Tribe”) are a federally recognized Indian nation in Texas, with its 100-acre reservation near El Paso, Texas. Brief for Petitioners, Ysleta del Sur Pueblo at 5. In the 1980s, the Pueblo sought to obtain federal trust status from the federal government.
